Definition Shielded Transaction / Addresses

This piece contains all you need to know about shield transaction addresses. The type of sheilded transaction. The attribute of sheilded transaction. Definition of shielded transaction/ address. How transaction between sheilded addresses work. And what shielded transaction address does.

Shielded addresses employ zero-knowledge facts to encode transaction data while still allowing network nodes to verify it.

A shielded transaction is one that takes place between two protected addresses. With the exception of transferring funds between Sprout and Sapling protected addresses, this effectively keeps the addresses, transaction amount, and note field hidden from public view.

Senders to a shielded address could include an encrypted note or not, and receivers of a shielded or deshielding transaction do not discover the sender address from their wallet transaction receipt. The receivers can only deduce the value delivered to their address and, if they receive to protected addresses, any encrypted memo that the member has added.

Definition Shielded Transaction / Addresses

Zcash has undoubtedly the biggest implementation of shielded transactions we’ve seen so far. Transparent addresses and shielded addresses are the two types of addresses in Zcash. Transparent addresses on the Zcash protocol, for example, are equal to public addresses on the Bitcoin protocol and perform likewise. The Transparent Value Pool interacts with all transparent addresses, and it is this pool that makes transaction data public and lets anybody to access it on the Zcash blockchain at any point.

Shielded addresses, on the other hand, protect transaction data and demand the production of zkSNARKs to validate transaction legitimacy. When compared to transparent addresses. These shielded addresses provide a new level of anonymity and security. Transaction from a transparent address to a transparent address is unshielded. And a transaction from a transparent address to a shielded address is shielded, a shielded address to a shielded address is shielded, and a shielded address to a transparent address unshielded.

The TRONZ privacy protocol that uses zk-SNARK to allow completely shielded transactions, is used for shielded transactions ( Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge ).

The following are the attributes of shielded transactions:

Dependable and secure

The TRONZ privacy protocol is a distributed cryptography technology in which all participants manage and run the network. All activities are examined and approved nodes throughout the network, and saved on a tamper-proof blockchain. The security of the TRONZ privacy protocol does not require the involvement of a third party.

Real time delivery

Conventional distributed crypto takes a long time to broadcast and validate transactions because it requires a large number of blocks. The TRONZ privacy protocol, on the other hand, may be verified reliably and almost immediately in less than 10 milliseconds.

Absolute Privacy Protection

TRONZ privacy protocol uses a complex Zero-knowledge Proof scheme to authenticate transactions not identifying senders, recipients, or the amount transmitted, hence preserving individual and transaction metadata secrecy.


The TRONZ privacy protocol protects the integrity of all on-chain operations, making it impossible for hacker to link relevant data on the blockchain to a specific person or subscriber.

Two types of addresses are supported by shielded transactions:
1. Shielded address “z-addr” (regular TRON address)

2. Public address “t-addr” (regular TRON address) (addresses that only consent shielded transactions)

Shielded addresses have the following traits when applied to regular TRON addresses:

•The private key structure is unique, with a root key (sk) and other keys deriving various functions from it.
•On the chain, transaction-specific information is buried and can only be accessed with the private keys.
•No resource model, i.e., the address contains no bandwidth or energy, and transactions do not require bandwidth or energy.
•Only shielded transactions are supported; other sorts of transactions, such as activating smart contracts, are not possible.
•There is no need to enable the address through a transaction because it does not care if it is activated or not.
•There is no authorization structure, so multi-signature transactions are not possible.

For anonymity, there are three types of transactions:

Shielded address to public address transaction

Public address information is public, while shielded address information is hidden.
Transactions between public addresses can also be thought of as regular token swaps.

Public address to shielded address transaction

Information about public addresses is available to the public, whereas information about shielded addresses is kept private.

Shielded to shielded address transactions

The source and destination addresses, as well as the value of the transaction, remain secret.

Shielded transactions use no Bandwidth End energy, although they do cost 0.1 TRONZ each transaction. If the transfer is from a shielded address to an inactive public address, the price to activate the address will be raised to 1 TRONZ.

TronLink wallet will synchronize block data to your smartphone in order to ensure that shielded transactions may be utilized regularly and that your privacy is protected. Please be patient as the process may take a long time.

Only the Nile Testnet currently supports shielded transactions. Choose the Nile version in Settings – Switch between versions or add the Nile Test Node in Settings – Node Settings to connect to the Nile Testnet.

Shielded transactions do not consume Bandwidth End energy, but they do cost 0.1 TRONZ apiece. The price to activate the address will be raised to 1 TRONZ if the transfer is from a shielded address to an inactive public address.
TronLink wallet will sync block data to your smartphone to ensure that you may use shielded transactions on a regular basis while maintaining your privacy. Please bear with us as the procedure may take some time.
Shielded transactions are presently only available on the Nile Testnet. To connect to the Nile Testnet, go to Settings – Switch between versions and select the Nile version, or go to Settings – Node Settings and add the Nile Test Node.

Shielded to shielded address transactions

A Shielded Address sender can a dd an encoded memo, and downward transaction receivers can retrieve the sender’s address in their wallet via a transaction receipt.
Only the amount given to the recipient’s address will be known. Does it appear to be difficult? Let’s have a look at a couple of examples.
In terms of Shielded Transactions, Zcash has the finest implementation so far. Transparent and shielded addresses are the two types of addresses in Zcash. The Zcash protocol’s transparent addresses are equal to the Bitcoin protocol’s transparent addresses, and hence work in the same way. Transparent addresses make transaction data public and allow anyone to observe the Zcash blockchain at any time.

Definition Shielded Transaction / Addresses

Saved or shielded addresses, on the other hand, encrypt transaction data and generate zkSNARKs to verify the Transaction’s validity. When we contrast safe or shielded addresses to transparent addresses, we can see that shielded addresses provide a new level of privacy and security. Based on this form of interpretation, there are three types of transactions.

Transactions with a shielded address from public addresses: Information about public addresses is public, whereas information about protected addresses is hidden. See also d3c294177401878f11

Shielded Address to Shielded Address Transaction: The sender and recipient addresses, as well as the transaction amount, are disguised. E.g. c55f39fbeae73b9a6

Transaction from Shielded Address to Public Address: Shielded Address Information is Hidden, while Public Address Data is Public. E.g. 384a2c137fc48ea45

Definition Shielded Transaction / Addresses

The following characteristics apply to shielded addresses:

A root key (SK) and various functions generated from other keys are used in the private key structure.
The Transaction’s exact information is hidden in the chain, and it may only be viewed using private keys.
There is no resource model, which means the address contains no bandwidth or power, and the Transaction does not require bandwidth or power.

How Transactions Between Shielded Addresses Work

We presented a general overview of Zcash Transactions in ‘Anatomy of a Zcash Transaction.’ The goal of this piece is to give a quick overview of how Zcash’s privacy-preserving transactions function, as well as where Zero-Knowledge proofs fit into the picture. We’re solely interested in transactions between shielded addresses, to use the language from that post (commonly referred to as z-addrs).

Let’s set all about establishing agreement via Proof of Work and the blockchain behind. Then concentrate on a particular node that has the right list of unspent transaction outputs in order to understand the privacy-preserving element.

First, let’s take a look at how this list appears on the bitcoin blockchain. Each unspent transaction output (UTXO) thought of as an unspent ‘note’ whose owner’s address/public key and the amount of BTC it contains are stated. Let’s pretend that each of these notes holds exactly 1 BTC and that there is only one note per address for the sake of clarity. As a result a node’s database has a list of unspent notes, each of which is defined simply by the owner’s address. The database could, for instance, appear such as this.

Note1=Note1= (PK1)(PK1), Note2=Note2= (PK2)(PK2), Note3=Note3= (PK3)(PK3)

Assume Anna’s address is PK1PK1, and she intends to send a 1 BTC note to Mike’s address, PK4.PK4. She conveys a signal to all nodes that basically says, “Move 1 BTC from PK1PK1 to PK4PK4”. She seals this signal with the private key sk1sk1, which corresponds to PK1,PK1, persuading the node that she has the authority to transfer funds from PK1.PK1. After verifying the signature and confirming that a 1 BTC note with address PK1,PK1 exists, the node will update its database as follows:

Note4=Note4= (PK4)(PK4), Note2=Note2= (PK2)(PK2), Note3=Note3= (PK3)(PK3)

Assume that each note also has a random’serial number’ (also known as a unique identifier) r.r. We’ll soon learn how useful this is for obtaining privacy. As a result, the database could appear such as this.

Note1=Note1= (PK1,r1)(PK1,r1), Note2=Note2= (PK1,r2)(PK1,r2), Note3=Note3= (PK2,r3)(PK2,r3)

A simple initial move towards privacy would be to have the node retain just the notes’ “encryptions,” or hashes, instead of the notes actually.

H1=H1= HASH(Note1)HASH(Note1), H2=H2= HASH(Note2)HASH(Note2), H3=H3= HASH(Note3)HASH(Note3)

To maintain anonymity, the node will keep the hash of a note even after it spent as a second step. As a result, it is no longer a database of unspent notes, but rather one of all notes ever created.

Definition Shielded Transaction / Addresses

The primary issue today is determining how to differentiate both spent and unspent notes without jeopardizing privacy. The nullifier set comes into play here. This is a list of all the serial numbers of wasted notes, hashed together. In addition to the set of hashed notes, each node keeps the nullifier set. The node’s database, for example, might look like this once Note2Note2 has been spent.

Hashed notesNullifier set
H1=H1= HASH(Note1)HASH(Note1)nf1=nf1= HASH(r2)HASH(r2)
H2=H2= HASH(Note2)HASH(Note2) 
H3=H3= HASH(Note3)HASH(Note3) 

The process A transaction is carried out

Let’s say Alice possesses Note1Note1 and wants to transfer it to Mike’s, who has the public key PK4.PK4. In essence, Anna will invalidate her note by posting its nullifier while simultaneously creating a new note under Mike’s ownership.

She does the following, to be more specific.

She generates a new serial number, r4r4, and creates a new note, Note4=Note4=. (PK4,r4). (PK4,r4).
She sends Bob Note4Note4 in a private message.
To all nodes, she sends the nullifier of Note1,Note1, nf2=nf2= HASH(r1)HASH(r1).
She transmits the hash of the new note to all nodes, H4=H4= HASH(Note4)HASH(Note4)

A node when it receives nf2nf2 and H4,H4, it will simply check if nf2nf2 already exists in the nullifier set to see if the note related to nf2nf2 has been consumed. If it doesn’t, the node adds nf2nf2 to the nullifier set and H4H4 to the set of hashed notes, confirming Alice and Mike’s transaction.

Hashed notesNullifier set
H1=H1= HASH(Note1)HASH(Note1)nf1=nf1= HASH(r2)HASH(r2)
H2=H2= HASH(Note2)HASH(Note2)nf2=nf2= HASH(r1)HASH(r1)
H3=H3= HASH(Note3)HASH(Note3) 
H4=H4= HASH(Note4)HASH(Note4) 

Already we inspected that Note1Note1 wasn’t spent… but we didn’t check whether it belonged to Anna. We didn’t even check if it was a’real’ note, in the sense that its hash was present in the node’s database of hashed notes. The simple solution would be for Anna to simply publish Note1,Note1 rather than its hash, but this would obviously compromise the privacy we are attempting to accomplish.

Zero-Knowledge proofs come to the rescue in this situation:

Alice will also post a proof-string to persuade the nodes that whoever published this transaction is aware of the numbers PK1,PK1, sk1,sk1, and r1r1 such that

In the collection of hashed notes, the hash of the note Note1=Note1= (PK1,PK1, r1)r1) remains.
The private key corresponding to PK1PK1 is sk1sk1 (and thus, whomever knows it is the rightful owner of Note1Note1).
r1r1’s hash is nf2nf2, (and so, if nf2nf2 – which we now know is the nullifier of

Note1Note1 – isn’t in the nullifier set at the moment,

Note1Note1 (It is not spent).

The features of Zero-Knowledge proofs ensure that r1r1 does not expose any information about PK1,PK1, sk1,sk1, or PK1.

The primary areas we cheated or omitted information are listed above.

We highlight that this is an oversimplification, and complete details can be found in the protocol specification.

And here are some of the most important details that neglected:

1.The hashed notes kept in a Merkle tree, not just as a list. This contributes significantly to the efficiency of Zero-Knowledge proofs.

2. Furthermore, rather than just the hash of the note, we need to record a computationally hidden and binding commitment of the note.

3. To protect future privacy of the recipient in relation to the sender, the nullifier is defined in a little more sophisticated manner.

4. We didn’t go into great length about how to do away with the need for a private channel between the source and the destination.

Definition Shielded Transaction / Addresses

see the list of things to also learn:

  1. Blockchain Technology
  2. Defi
  3. NFTs
  4. DAOs
  5. Crypto
  6. Web 3.0
  7. Altcoin Tokenomics
  8. Metaverse
  9. Smart Contracts

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